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EO25x1

Brazil:
Race and Its Implication
for Political Stability (C)

A Research Paper

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A Research Paper

*Information available as of 20 August 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

This research paper was prepared by [EO25x1] [EO25x1] of the Office of Geographic and Societal Research. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Western Hemisphere–Africa Branch, Social Science Research Division, OGSR, on [EO25x1] (U)

It was reviewed by the Office of Political Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and the Offices of Economic Research and Central Reference. The contents of this report were also discussed with several academic experts on Brazil as well as with former US representatives to Brazil. (U)

Brazil: Race and Its Implications for Political Stability (C)

Overview

Race relations are likely to play a role of growing prominence in Brazilian politics in the 1980s and beyond. The blacks and mulattoes who make up almost half of the country's population are showing signs of dissatisfaction with a system that severely limits their social and economic opportunities. As pressures for greater racial equality evolve, policies will probably be adopted to improve the status of coloreds; Brazilian governments have traditionally been flexible enough to respond to legitimate demands and strong enough to resist serious challenges through co-opting, manipulating, and controlling dissident elements. Although race is likely to become a more significant political issue in Brazil, we see no regime threatening danger emerging from the anticipated increase in racial unrest. [1]

The old Brazilian myth of racial democracy appears to be gradually eroding. While the structure of society has retarded the development of leadership, political organization, and racial consciousness among blacks and mulattoes, indications are that the darker segments of the population may be shifting from traditional class to more group-oriented interests. Clear evidence of white prejudice and discrimination against blacks and mulattoes has accumulated and is being more widely publicized than before in the local and international press. In a reversal of previous trends, nonwhites may now be increasing as a percentage of the total population. This perception is heightened by regional and rural-to-urban migrations that are bringing blacks and dark mulattoes into closer contact, competition, and possible conflict with whites. Since the increasing rates of crime tend to be blamed on the darker Brazilians, the whites may be beginning to feel overwhelmed by the blacks and mulattoes.

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[1] The Office of Political Analysis does not agree that race is likely to become a significant political issue in Brazil in the foreseeable future. Both OPA analysts and the authors of the paper agree that the dominant lines of political conflict in Brazil will continue to reflect social class, economic, and regional cleavages, rather than race. OPA analysts further believe that the value system to which most Brazilians subscribe would have to change dramatically for race relations to develop substantial political content. They do not see signs of heightened racial awareness on the part of a few Brazilians as indicative that such a major value shift is under way, nor do they believe that groups that presently have or are likely to compete for a significant share of political power would perceive much advantage in trying to convert racial discrimination into a domestic political issue.

Although we do not expect racial tensions to be among the most important factors affecting US-Brazilian relations during the decade, we do see some racial issues that could prove troublesome. Should Brazilians protesting discrimination look to US citizens for sympathy and guidance, the United States could find itself drawn into an internal Brazilian dispute. At the same time, US public opinion could be turned against Brazil by perceived human rights abuses, thereby adding a further constraint to US policy in the area.

The above material is ~~Confidential~~.

Contents

Appendixes

BRAZIL
Population and Regions

Persons per square mile

| 0 | 26 | 130 | 260 |

| 0 | 10 | 50 | 100 |

Persons per square kilometer

Region boundary

Boa Vista

Rio Negro

Macapá

North

Amazon

Manaus

Amazon

Belém

São Luís

Northeast

Fortaleza

Teresina

Natal

João Pessoa

Recife

Maceió

Aracaju

Salvador

Rio Madeira

Rio Tapajós

Rio Branco

Pôrto Velho

Rio Tocantins

Rio São Francisco

Center-West

Cuiabá

Brasília

Goiânia

Rio Paraguai

Rio Paraná

Southeast

Belo Horizonte

Vitória

São Paulo

Rio de Janeiro

Curitiba

South

Florianópolis

Pôrto Alegre

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BRAZIL
Racial Composition by Region, 1960*

Region boundary

White Mixed Black

North

4%
23%
73%

42%
8%
50%

Northeast

Center-West

57%
38%

Southeast

11%
26%
63%

South

2%
89%

Unclassified

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Total population

40,000,000

20,000,000

10,000,000

5,000,000

2,500,000

*Last year population data available by race. Term "mixed" used here to indicate persons of mixed, mainly black and white descent; persons of mixed Indian and other descent also included. Orientals and Indians of unmixed descent, less than 2 percent of total population, not shown separately.

Brazil:
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I know a cry of anguish,
and I can write this cry of anguish,
and I can bellow this cry of anguish,
would you like to hear?
I am a black, Lord, I am a . . . black
                    Osvaldo de Camargo

Introduction

Race relations are likely to play an increasing role in Brazilian life and politics in the 1980s. Nonwhites, who make up almost half the total population,[2] have already begun to challenge a system that, through subtle but effective forms of color discrimination, severely limits their social and economic mobility. With the economic climate less sanguine than in the past decade and competition among interest groups on the rise, gross injustices in Brazilian society will become more and more apparent. (c)

This paper examines the characteristics and dimensions of the race issue and its potential impact on Brazil's political stability. In the section "Prolonged Racial Peace," we explore the factors that traditionally have prevented race from posing a significant threat to the political system. "Old Patterns Under Attack" focuses on trends that could enhance the prominence of race in Brazilian politics. Next we treat regional variations in race relations and, in the final section, present a checklist to help Brazil-watchers monitor changing racial patterns. Appendix A looks at the relationship of Communists and other leftists with the racial situation in Brazil. Appendix B includes some remarks on our research and an annotated bibliography of open-source material on race in Brazil. (c)

Brazilians use the term *povo de cor*, people of color, to refer to blacks and mulattoes (persons of mixed Negro and Caucasian descent). Both white and darker

Brazilians have an extensive and complex nomenclature for the many variations in skin shades and facial features. The use of this nomenclature varies considerably from region to region and even among people in the same region depending upon their individual perceptions. A light-skinned mulatto, for example, is generally consiered dark in southern Brazil but almost white in the north and northeast. The type and intensity of racial discrimination faced by blacks and mulattoes depends on similar variables. In this paper, as an analytical tool to explore the issue of race, we will simply use the term "colored" for all individuals of total or partial black ancestry, except where it is appropriate to make a distinction between blacks and mulattoes. Indians and Orientals, making up less than 2 percent of the total population of Brazil, are not considered in this study. (c)

Prolonged Racial Peace

While Brazil's lower class is multiracial, the colored population is by almost every measure—economic and social status, political leadership, and representation—the most deprived sector of society. Nevertheless, no sustained racially motivated movement has developed to challenge the system. Lack of effective colored protest both reinforces and in part stems from Brazil's myth of racial democracy itself.[3] The myth, compounded of half-truths and distortions of history (for example, the purportedly benign character of

[2] The 1980 census of Brazil estimated the total population at 119,024,000. (U)

[3] The expression racial democracy is used here and by Brazilians to indicate a society in which racial harmony prevails and in which all citizens have equal economic and political opportunities.

1

Race relations in the United States cannot be used as a model for understanding the more subtle and complex Brazilian system. Both countries had large slave populations until the latter part of the 19th century, but the subsequent integration of these groups and their descendants into the larger national societies has followed different courses. The bitterness of the abolition movement, civil war, and reconstruction era laid the groundwork for later segregation laws in the United States. In Brazil, on the other hand, slavery ended in 1889 without widespread violence; moreover, the development of a national mythology which led Brazilians to view their society as one drawing strength from diverse origins militated against institutionalized racism. In the United States, despite considerable miscegenation, a sharp color line was, and to some extent still is, observed, but in Brazil with its great admixture of races many shades of skin color are identified and each tends to be associated with a particular social rank—with white at the top and black at the bottom of the scale. Far from being "color blind," as often claimed, Brazilians are acutely aware of color differences. (C)

Brazilian slavery), was given wide currency in the writings of the Brazilian intellectual elite, especially those of highly respected sociologist Gilberto Freyre, one of the architects of the racial myth and a frequent opponent of those who criticize Brazilian race relations. (C)

The idea that historical circumstances have created a land of racial harmony and democracy has been an integral part of the national mythology and accepted by almost all Brazilians. The widespread acceptance of the myth has in itself prevented the development of racial polarization and made racial tolerance an important part of the Brazilian self-image: the proclivity of the Portuguese colonists to mate with their black female slaves, the supposedly mild treatment of the slaves, and the peacefulness of the Brazilian abolition movement help account for the lack of animosity between the races. The establishment of the First Republic, which paralleled the abolition of slavery in

Figure 1
Race and Class, Northeast Brazil

White   Mulatto   Black

A Brazilian scholar's view of the relationship between color and social class in Brazil. While this depiction represents the Northeast, the general relationship holds throughout Brazil: whites are concentrated in the upper and middle classes, blacks in the lower class, and mulattoes in intermediate positions. (After Thales de Azevedo, As Elites de Côr. São Paulo, 1955).

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1889, was based upon the idea of a free society into which coloreds were to be welcomed with no restrictions on their upward mobility. Brazil, in fact, is often characterized by both local and foreign observers as a "society of class not caste." That is, the significant divisions are said to be determined by educational level, economic status, and manners rather than by race. (C)

A body of legislation against discrimination, the absence of legal and overt racial restrictions on social and economic mobility, and the very real progress made by at least a small percentage of coloreds further strengthen and validate the myth for most Brazilians. Indeed, one Brazilian sociologist writing in

Racial Myth Versus Reality

The Myth

There is in all likelihood no earthly paradise, but in respect to race relations the Brazilian situation is probably the nearest approach to a paradise anywhere in the world.

The secret of Brazil's success in building a humane . . . modern civilization . . . has been her genius for compromise. . . . Hence their ethnic democracy, the almost perfect equality of opportunity for all men regardless of race or color. . . . A general spirit of human brotherhood is much stronger among Brazilians than race, color class, or religious prejudice. (Gilberto Freyre New World in the Tropics) (C)

The absence of violent rancors due to race constitutes one of the peculiarities of the feudal system in the tropics . . . softened by the hot climate and by the effects of a discegenation that tended to dissolve such prejudices. . . .

To be sure, the social distance between masters and slaves . . . was an enormous one. . . . The Portuguese, however, . . . experienced the rule of the Moors, a dark-skinned race . . . (and) they (the Portuguese) had long since formed the habit of discovering in colored peoples . . . human beings, who were brothers . . . with whom it was possible to fraternize. . . . And all of this . . . tended to mitigate (slavery). (Gilberto Freyre The Masters and the Slaves) (C)

The Reality

A black policeman tries to arrest a white child beater; the criminal responds: "Look at yourself . . . whoever saw a Negro arrest a white? Only yesterday you . . . were in slave quarters."

"I have no sympathy for Negroes. I don't like those people. I say this to their faces."

"They (the company managers) would never hire a Negro for any job. The boss not only doesn't like Negroes, he's also afraid of them."

"No one likes to marry off daughters, sisters, or other relatives to Negroes."

"Its funny . . . we don't think we have any prejudice, and somewhere along the line we always do." (Responses to questions on race from Florestan Fernandes, *The Negro in Brazilian Society*) (C)

Brazilian slavery was, if anything, physically harsher than North American slavery. There were more slave rebellions and runaway slaves in Brazil. . . . Suicides were much more common. . . . The use of iron masks to prevent slaves from eating dirt or drinking was widespread in Brazil. . . . Slave women were frequently used by their owners as prostitutes. Finally, so many slaves were simply worked to death in Brazil that the only way of maintaining their population was through fresh imports. (Adapted from Carl N. Degler, Neither Black nor White) (C)

3

the 1940s reported that acceptance of the myth was so strong that questioning its validity was considered "psychologically deviational." Any who have tried to challenge the myth's basic assumptions—and there are those who have—are sharply criticized for "destroying the national sociology and anthropology." (C)

Another notion that gained wide acceptance is that of the "whitening" or "bleaching process," whereby the black element of the population was supposedly disappearing through miscegenation. The idea of whitening evolved during the late 1880s when Brazilian intellectuals, influenced by European racial theories, thought that intermarriage would lead to a whiter population because "white genes were stronger than dark genes and Brazilians always chose lighter mates." Their thinking was reinforced by great increases in the white population from immigration during the 1870s followed by census figures between 1890 and 1920 showing a decline in the percentage of blacks in the population and a decided increase in the lighter mulatto group. [4] Belief that the huge colored population would eventually disappear made the "race problem" seem less threatening to whites. The colored population became, not a potential enemy, but the genetic raw material for a future great white Brazil. (C)

Brazilian whites believed that the lack of widespread protests indicated that coloreds also accepted the myth of racial democracy. This perception diminished white fear of colored competition for good jobs and other benefits of middle class life. Moreover, the existence of a small but significant number of successful coloreds allowed whites to label poor blacks and mulattoes as simply creatures of poverty, not victims of racism. Faith in the justness of the system strengthened belief in Brazil's greatness. (C)

Even while maintaining belief in the myth of racial democracy, Brazilian whites have long held low opinions of blacks and mulattoes. Studies sponsored by the United Nations in the 1950s to discover the key to

[4] Information gathered on the racial composition of the population during the 1980 census has not yet been published. The latest country-wide census data available on racial composition is from the 1960 census. (C)

what were believed to be ideal race relations turned up abundant evidence of prejudice and discrimination. Researchers have found that whites, especially in southeastern urban centers, such as Sao Paulo, generally dislike coloreds of all classes and accept them only if "they know their place." Among the dominant elements of the negative white stereotype of blacks and mulattoes are perceptions that they are unclean, superstitious, immoral, and lazy. (C)

Escape Mechanisms. In addition to the myth, a number of other factors have tended to limit racial friction. The limited channels that do exist for colored mobility in Brazil help decrease the pressure for racial justice. The most prevalent form of upward mobility is via what one scholar has called "the mulatto escape hatch," which allows lighter coloreds and those who marry lighter spouses to advance up the social scale. The possibility of escaping the perceived stigma of blackness reconciles large numbers of Brazilians to the prevailing pattern of race relations and places a wedge between light and dark coloreds. (C)

Despite general prejudice against coloreds, lighter mulattoes have been able to obtain better jobs and a degree of social acceptance. This has created an "obsession" for whiteness among blacks and dark mulattoes, leading them to form their own internal hierarchy with light-skinned mulattoes at the top and blacks at the bottom. Many light mulattoes adopt what they think are totally white patterns of behavior in their effort to achieve middle class status, consciously or unconsciously abandoning their racial and cultural identities for social mobility and acceptance. (C)

On the other hand, movement up the social scale—however achieved—has the psychological effect of making coloreds seem lighter both to the other coloreds and to whites. Thus a light mulatto or, more rarely, a black, becomes essentially "white" if he manages to break the racial barriers and achieve economic power and social prominence. For Brazilians the expression "money whitens" has a very real meaning. (C)

The sports and entertainment industries provide notable avenues for colored mobility. A Brazilian sociologist reported in the early 1960s that almost 85 percent of all professional soccer players were colored—a domination of the field that persists today. Another researcher noted that the tremendous growth in radio audiences was not only popularizing colored entertainers but also was attracting a large number of coloreds to technical and other jobs in the industry. (C)

Military service is another avenue of mobility. For the many blacks and mulattoes drafted into the army for one-year stints, the service provides skills that improve their status in civilian society when they are discharged. Although there are still no black general officers in the Brazilian military, the number of coloreds joining the officer corps has recently shown a marked increase. Vacancies for blacks and mulattoes have opened up in military schools, such as the Agulhas Negras Military Academy, the Brazilian West Point, because the sons of white army officers, who generally had followed their fathers into the service, are increasingly choosing more lucrative careers. The decline in the traditional pool of candidates has forced the schools to recruit from among high school and university ROTC-type programs, many of which include coloreds. The naval officer corps, however, remains entirely white. (C)

Federal politics has been a channel of upward mobility for only a few exceptional coloreds. One black senator recently assumed office as the alternate to a white who was too ill to serve. Between 1974 and March 1979 only three blacks and one dark mulatto were among the 364 federal deputies; a very few light mulattoes were also present. In the senate during the same period, of the 64 members, there were only one black and one light mulatto. All of these coloreds were from the industrialized southeast and far south regions. No similar data are available on state and local governments, but indications suggest that blacks and dark mulattoes are seriously underrepresented at those levels as well. (C)

Economics and social alienation have led many coloreds into illegal activities. In Sao Paulo almost half of the prostitutes are colored, and most robberies nationwide are believed to be committed by blacks and dark mulattoes. Proceeds from crime, including the lucrative drug trade, provide at least some measure of economic mobility to many coloreds and the activities themselves divert energies that might otherwise challenge the system. (C)

Afro-Brazilian religious cult centers and samba clubs, still another means of escaping some effects of poverty, also militate against colored alienation from Brazilian society. These traditionally apolitical organizations provide charitable and mutual aid benefits for their members. They also serve as vehicles by which charismatic individuals can achieve satisfaction in leadership roles. The spectacular pre-Lenten carnival celebrations, in which samba clubs play the leading part, serve as an emotional outlet to which members look forward each year. (C)

Lack of Colored Leadership. Educated blacks and mulattoes—whom one might expect to be in the vanguard of any racial movement—have largely either accepted the myth or avoided jeopardizing their status by challenging it. Many colored intellectuals have actively studied Afro-Brazilian culture since at least the 1930s, but with a few exceptions they have not focused on the most important social, economic, and racial problems. Those who have ventured into these sensitive areas have been unable to reach a consensus on the real status of the colored population, on interracial relations, or on the best course of action for potential advocates of racial justice. (C)

No substantial body of colored literature expressing discontent has emerged. Virtually all novels and other literary works by colored authors have followed conventional themes and have not addressed racial matters beyond the folkloric level. From the 1930s through the 1950s colored Brazilian intellectuals did draw on themes of the African "negritude" movement aimed at promoting racial pride. Attempts to adapt negritude to the less-polarized and self-conscious Brazilian coloreds, however, failed to generate the militancy or racial identity that the movement produced among thinkers in black Africa or the Caribbean. Bahia never became the "black Rome" envisioned by Brazil's leading colored writers. (C)

5

It is not surprising that the few intellectuals who have tried to forge racial solidarity have so far attracted little support from other members of the small colored middle class. Successful colored Brazilians, while conscious of their heritage and opposed to discrimination, tend to view their own achievements as the result of individual initiative and of the basic justice of Brazilian ways. In fact, some of the more successful coloreds, to prove their "whiteness," become the harshest critics of lower class (colored) values. Their comments tend to discredit the statements of other upwardly mobile coloreds who do speak out against discrimination. They, however, are very reluctant to buck the system. For example, in 1980 a black television reporter who had been the object of blatant discrimination refused to cooperate with a colored group that wanted to make her a symbol. (c)

The large lower class colored population, like most lower class populations throughout the world, is in no position to develop effective leadership. Several recent studies indicate that members of this group have a very low self-image. In the late 1960s more than 70 percent of the coloreds interviewed in urban centers did not think of themselves as having a profession and viewed much of their working life as a matter of chance; even upwardly mobile coloreds were found to retain much of the emotional insecurity inherent in lower class life. These studies picture the colored poor as generally fatalistic about their status and reluctant to challenge the system. They defer to authority and share many of the negative attitudes of their more prosperous countrymen toward radical change. (s)

Political Consciousness. The colored population has not undertaken concerted or sustained political action on its own, and until very recently no major political party has tried to attract coloreds as a group or made race a political issue. Between 1931 and 1937, the Negro Front functioned as a legal political party with 30,000 members and many more supporters, but the main thrust of its program was to provide coloreds with the skills needed to enter white society—not to force changes in race relations at the ballot box. (s)

While no nationwide surveys of colored voting patterns are available, a number of studies of the black vote indicate a considerable diffusion of loyalties. A 1960 survey of black voters in Rio de Janeiro, for example, shows that poor and middle class blacks divided their votes among the left-of-center and the more conservative parties. The few blacks active in state and federal government have diverse loyalties. For example, the newly elected president of the Sao Paulo municipal council is black and progovernment, while one of the gubernatorial candidates for Rio Grande do Sul is black and left of center; neither has focused special attention on the problems of the colored population. (s)

The Government, the Media, and Race. The Brazilian Government discourages special interest groups, such as the coloreds, from pressing for change or expressing grievances outside traditional channels. The government's attitude helps support the myth and hampers unity. A 1966 decree, for example, specifically forbids political propaganda that is designed to "exploit racial or class prejudices." Even black religious cults have come under official harassment when they appeared to delve into political issues. In August 1977, the government allowed only two of 11 delegates to attend a conference on black culture in Colombia, and in December of the same year, a US-based group was expelled for attempting to politicize several black organizations. The government also controls the black samba clubs, which some young blacks have attempted to politicize. Control is exerted through funding of the annual pre-Lenten parades and strict rules on the content of performances. (c)

Although the government does support at least some studies of Afro-Brazilian culture, several black intellectuals have charged that this is done merely to divert colored intellectuals away from social and economic issues. Some coloreds also claim that race questions were eliminated from the 1970 census specifically to prevent race from becoming a "meaningful category statistically." Government officials countered by asserting that the questions were not needed because race was no longer a problem. (c)

While frequently admitting to the existence of race prejudice, publishers of important newspapers and magazines have done much to sustain the myth of

racial democracy. Journalists in the 1960s acknowledged that race prejudice existed in Brazil, but stressed that it was insignificant and lacked political implications compared with the violent racial conflicts then taking place in the United States. In interviews with black scholars from abroad, Brazilian journalists consistently steer them away from criticism of local conditions and toward their own experiences with foreign racism. In other cases, Brazilians reviewing foreign scholars' work on race questions in Brazil interpret what might be construed as criticism of Brazil as praise. One reviewer misrepresented an objectively critical study to show how effectively the "black problem" in his country had been handled. (C)

Brazilian television, which reaches more than half of the country's inhabitants, has generally avoided the race issue. As late as 1978, federal censors clipped a segment from a program on the abolition movement that also dealt with contemporary race relations and according to press reports, pressured a major newspaper into abandoning a series of articles on the status of blacks in Brazil. The media, while tending to ignore racial protests and issues affecting coloreds, give extensive coverage to the activities of such scholars as the venerable Gilberto Freyre. (C)

The Church and Race. The Catholic Church, as an institution, and almost all clerical reformists have approached the issue of social and economic injustice from a class perspective. Even the most radical priests have not attempted to distinguish blacks and mulattoes from other members of the oppressed lower class. The church-sponsored Ecclesiastical Base Communities (CEBs)—a network of about 90,000 reform oriented, grass-roots organizations—have thus far adhered to this approach. Even CEBs with heavy colored membership have not tried to separate their plight from that of the poor in general. The Pope's visit to Brazil in July 1980, despite his well-publicized tours of poor black neighborhoods, also failed to focus on coloreds as a group. (C)

Old Patterns Under Attack
Many experts, both Brazilian and foreign, maintain that the current racial situation will persist essentially unchanged. Others, especially those Brazilianists who have made race relations their principal focus of study, contend that the racial situation holds the potential for serious political unrest within this decade. We come down somewhere in between. While we agree that the stabilizing factors of the past are deeply rooted in Brazilian culture and history and thus will continue to have a potent influence, we also note an increasing number of factors that point to a change in the traditional pattern of race relations. We believe that growing colored consciousness, rising media exposure of racism, economic and demographic trends, and international concern are together likely to cause race to become an issue of increasing importance to Brazilian authorities. (C)

Growing Colored Consciousness. The key to significant change in the racial status quo will be a perception by large numbers of coloreds that their present condition is unjust and intolerable, and that they are capable of changing their situation. Racial consciousness appears already to have intensified in parts of southern Brazil. A 1973 study of Sao Paulo shows that colored consciousness was considerably higher than thought by previous researchers and that those interviewed were willing to demonstrate to press their case. Other signs of growing colored consciousness have included the following:

- A US Consular official in Rio Grande do Sul reported that in October 1980 the First Meeting of the State Black Community was held in a poor working-class suburb in Porto Alegre, the state capital. Some of the concerns raised were racial segregation at the local, state, and national levels; job discrimination in industry, and the problem of developing black consciousness.

- Another group in Rio Grande do Sul, the "Black Movement," celebrated 20 November 1980 as "National Black Consciousness Day;" the date marks the anniversary of the death of a black who led a slave revolt.

- In the neighboring state of Santa Catarina, a small organization of activists called the "Afro-Brazilian Group" now holds regular meetings. (C)

While there have been no massive demonstrations in Brazil comparable with those that took place in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, there have been manifestations of discontent. In one recent example, demonstrators chanted slogans and shouted "unity for the blacks" and "down with racism" in protest against an incident in which a black youth was prevented from using an elevator at a shopping center near Sao Paulo. The demonstration was sponsored by a local black community sociocultural movement and received support from the local Brazilian Democratic Party Movement. The protestors demanded that the center's owners show more respect for blacks and chanted "Negroes are not just samba, soccer, and rum." (S)

Interest in Afro-Brazilian culture appears to be moving beyond the confines of folkloric studies and could become a significant force in developing racial identity. A growing body of scholarly works produced in recent years by both foreign and Brazilian authors, black and white, has attacked the old myth of racial democracy in Brazil and called for improvements in the status of coloreds. (C)

The trend toward greater interest in socially relevant aspects of the racial situation emerged as early as 1972 during the first Civic Afro-Brazilian Week marking the 84th anniversary of the abolition of slavery. US Embassy officials reported that the week's activities "created a framework to increase racial consciousness among blacks." In 1978 "O Quilombo" (a samba club whose name refers to Brazil's former runaway slave sanctuaries) refused to participate in the carnival celebrations, charging that the parades exploited and degraded Afro-Brazilian culture. In August 1980, celebrations of the 350th anniversary of the establishment of Palmares, greatest of the slave sanctuaries, were attended not only by Brazilian coloreds but also black diplomats representing a number of African countries. (C)

The television series "Roots," shown in mid-1980, provoked considerable interest and discussion. At about the same time a Nigerian filmmaker working in Brazil produced "A Deusa Negra," a film about black slavery in Brazil and the efforts of a Nigerian to find

Figure 2
Studies on Race Relations in Brazil 1930-80[a]
That Either Support or Attack the Myth of
Racial Democracy

Pro-Myth ◄ | ► Anti-Myth
Number of Studies

[a]Based on entries under "Ethnic and Race Relations, General Studies" in Robert M. Levine's Brazil Since 1970, An Annotated Bibliography for Social Historians, New York, 1980.

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his family among Brazilian slaves; one reviewer described the story as "a search for black roots." (C)

In May 1981, press reports from the northeastern city of Salvador indicated that growing interest in Afro-Brazilian culture was already helping to raise black consciousness there. Most blacks were said to have "stopped straightening their hair" and African dress and dancing were becoming increasingly popular. In describing the last carnival in Salvador, one article in a leading Rio de Janeiro journal said that the black paraders "dressed in costumes of African motif and dancing to Yoruba or Nago rhythms and verses" had "assumed a form—consciously political or not—of contesting the habits, culture, and prevailing political order, typically white and oppressive." Interest in their African heritage has drawn blacks and mulattoes to Afro-Brazilian cults at an increasing rate. The

growing strength of colored identity has, according to one observer, at times assumed "an aggressive posture of protest and affirmation against whites who are seen as representatives of the constituted political order." (C)

The study of Afro-Brazilian culture moved far beyond the realm of folklore at the annual meeting of the Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science held in July 1981, in Salvador, Bahia. For the first time the sessions included discussions of the status of blacks in Brazilian society. In connection with the meeting, the former director of the Society for the Study of Black Culture of Brazil stated that the Academy of Science had selected the topic because the ongoing political liberalization policies "do not appear to offer hope to deprived sectors for full participation in national economic and political life." The sessions received extensive media coverage and may have helped raise the sensitivities of both whites and coloreds to the race situation. (C)

Race and Political Change. The government's liberalization plans, aimed at creating the framework for an eventual return to a civilian presidency, have encouraged various interest groups—including the coloreds—to become increasingly outspoken. The more open political atmosphere should facilitate the organizational activities of those supporting the coloreds' case, and the government has shown at least some official toleration for protests. At a women's conference in 1975, for example, colored participants were permitted to publish a manifesto protesting sexual exploitation of black and mulatto women. (C)

In mid-1978 the United Negro Movement (MNU), an alliance of eight black organizations, was formed in Sao Paulo to protest police brutality and to press for an end to racial discrimination. The movement is trying to develop grass-roots support by establishing "centers of struggle," groups of three or more blacks who meet informally to discuss the MNU nine-point program:

To Oppose:
- Racial discrimination in jobs, housing, and health care.
- Racial discrimination in unions.
- Racial discrimination in education.
- Exploitation and commercialization of black culture.
- Police brutality.

To Support:
- Equal access to public accommodations, recreational facilities, and clubs.
- The participation of women in black liberation.
- The international struggle against racism.
- The right to organize "Centros de Luta" (Centers for the Struggle), to organize politically, to revive the black press, and to push for giving the vote to illiterates. (C)

MNU leaders look for support wherever blacks are concentrated, including schools, factories, sports clubs, and cult centers. The organization has only about 300 active members but claims thousands of sympathizers, and its role in demonstrations has made its leaders important spokesmen for the colored population. On one occasion in 1978, MNU leaders were able to attract an estimated 5,000 supporters to a rally protesting discrimination against blacks by white social clubs. Although the leadership of the MNU is leftist, the first director was a self-proclaimed Marxist, and Brazilian security officials accuse the group of Communist sympathies, the organization has been allowed to continue its activities. Judiciary support came in April 1981 when a black federal deputy from Sao Paulo introduced a measure that would strengthen the provisions of the 30-year-old Afonso Arinos Law, the principal antidiscrimination law in Brazil. The proposal calls for harsher penalties for discriminating against coloreds and would make "inciting racial hatred or discrimination" a crime. (C)

Party politics over the next several years is likely to enhance the importance of the incipient colored rights movement. The potential for exploitation of the race issue by new political parties formed under the government's liberalization program has already been demonstrated. In July 1979 the former state governor Leonel Brizola, at that time in exile, accused the

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government of racism and pledged that his party (the Democratic Workers Party, [PDT]) would make the racial issue a significant part of its political platform. Brizola is now planning to run for governor of Rio de Janeiro and has created an Afro-Brazilian Committee within the PDT under the leadership of long-time black activist Abdias do Nascimento and Communist labor organizer Olympio Marques dos Santos. In March 1981, the committee sponsored a "Week of Solidarity With Peoples in the Struggle Against Racism and Discrimination." Brizola is clearly using such tactics to build his strength among blacks and mulattoes in his bid for state office. Farther south, in Rio Grande do Sul, a US observer reporting similar activity stated that "the leftist opposition political parties in this state are making themselves the spokesmen for black discontent." (s)

In the northeastern state of Bahia, politicians from all parties are also vying for the support of coloreds, who probably make up more than half the voters statewide. In May 1981, the progovernment state governor sponsored a massive ceremony in the opposition-controlled capital, Salvador, to mark the birthday of a noted graphic artist whose work centers on Afro-Brazilian themes. The governor managed to induce the much-revered black leader of an Afro-Brazilian cult to attend the ceremony as a guest of honor; she had not appeared outside her cult center in more than two decades. The ceremony attracted thousands of blacks, many of them members of samba clubs, and other local groups. Along with elected state officials, numerous political candidates from various parties also were there hoping to receive the cult leader's endorsement. (c)

The rally in Salvador reflects a slowly evolving strategy of the ruling Social Democratic Party (PDS) to attract the support it will need to maintain strength for the 1982 elections. The left-of-center Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) is challenging PDS regional control and reportedly sees a natural constituency among the oppressed coloreds; it is working hard through neighborhood political and social clubs to gain their support and plans to develop similar programs throughout Brazil. (c)

Thus far, the various factions of the illegal but still functioning Brazilian Communist Party have shown no interest in exploiting the race issue. The party's close adherence to a class perspective and its fear of government security forces work against any identification with the plight of blacks and mulattoes. Smaller, more militant, clandestine groups have been closely monitored by Brazilian security forces and are not known to have agitated among the coloreds. (s)

Foreign Pressures and Influences. The example of the US civil rights movement and growing relations with Sub-Saharan Africa could give additional encouragement to coloreds in Brazil and force the government to be more attentive to their problems. Black citizens from the United States have made various short-lived contacts with Brazilian groups advocating racial justice, and at least one has conferred with MNU leaders and attended their national conference. A report, based on this meeting and published in a popular black journal in the United States, told its readers to prepare to assist the MNU with money and guidance; it stressed that the Brazilians wanted to use the US civil rights movement as their model. (s)

At least since the 1960s, Brazilians have tried to exploit their African heritage and reputation for racial harmony to help expand trade with black Africa. The Brazilian elite believes it has a special understanding of the region that uniquely qualifies Brazil to serve as a bridge between the black countries of the Third World and the industrialized West. Purely economic considerations and self-interest, however, largely account for the sizable expansion of trade that has taken place. Africans have long recognized Brazil as an enclave of white power. In 1978 a high-ranking African visitor asked his host at a banquet in Brazil, "But where are the blacks, where are the blacks?" In 1979 the oil-rich and racially sensitive Nigerians stated that they were disillusioned with the prospects for close ties with Brazil because of what they perceived as its racist policies. In late 1980, US Embassy officials in Brasilia reported that black African diplomats were "universally shocked" by the low status of the colored Brazilian population. (c)

At an international conference on sanctions against South Africa held in Paris in May 1981, parallels were drawn between the situation of blacks in South Africa and blacks in Brazil. A member of the Executive Commission of the United Negro Movement of Brazil declared that "racism in Brazil is a symptom of a cultural neurosis," and that it signifies that Brazilians are ashamed to admit their Africanness or to acknowledge the fundamental contributions of blacks to Brazilian culture. Besides asserting that Brazilian black workers receive 20 to 50 percent less than Brazilian whites doing the same jobs, she stated that the idea of the "whitening process" that is articulated along with the "myth of racial democracy" helps keep blacks at the bottom of the social ladder in Brazil. She characterized the "masked racism" in Brazil as distinguished by two practices: police violence against black citizens (who are described simply as "marginals"); and media representation of blacks in the stereotypes of soccer players or samba dancers "whose 'privileged place,' aside from carnival, is in the police column." (c)

The Brazilian Government is countering these adverse sentiments with lavish receptions for visiting black dignitaries, stepped up high-level official visits to Africa, and repeated condemnations of South Africa's racist policies. For example, President Joao Baptista Figueiredo sent a message to the international conference on sanctions against South Africa expressing "Brazil's solidarity with the South African people" and reaffirming Brazil's support for the struggle against the South African racist regime. Although trade between Brazil and Africa is unlikely to be seriously affected by the race issue in the near future, official Brazilian recognition of the international dimensions of this problem may strengthen the credibility of protest groups, enhance racial consciousness, and attract support for equality from sympathetic whites. (c)

Although there is no evidence thus far of Cuban meddling in Brazilian racial matters, the possibility that it may occur in the future cannot be ruled out—particularly in view of Castro's apparent return to a more militant, hardline foreign policy. Cuba took advantage of racial turmoil in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s to launch propaganda attacks against this country and has continued to exploit the race issue in more recent times. For example, Cuban propaganda using racial themes is now being directed at Curacao and other predominantly black Caribbean islands. It is probable that Cuba, because of its precarious economic position, will prefer to keep its options open regarding Brazil—an important co-member of the International Sugar Organization that Castro would be reluctant to antagonize. (c)

Race and the Evolving Economic Scene. During the next several years, at least, Brazil's economy will remain vulnerable to a growth slowdown that would portend harder times for the poorer, darker segment of the population. Following a decade of considerable growth, in 1980 the GNP rose by an impressive 8.0 percent and employment expanded substantially. The rapid growth, however, was accompanied by triple-digit inflation and severe balance-of-payments problems. Now, spending cuts and other restrictive policies to reduce inflation are slowing economic activities; no substantial improvements in real income are expected before 1982. Looking beyond the next few years, the Brazilian economy—with its huge external debt and high dependency on foreign oil—faces more constraints in the 1980s than in the 1970s. (c)

At the same time that economic growth is likely to be lagging, a very large number of young people will be entering the labor market because of the high population growth in the past. If economic growth slows sharply over the next few years, coloreds will find competition for jobs increasingly keen. Even allowing for rapid economic expansion, the current rate of job creation, about a million annually, does not open enough new opportunities to accommodate all job-seekers. According to one estimate, unemployment is already much higher among blacks than among whites. The problem of colored unemployment is so pervasive that it was one of the major themes of the "First State Meeting in Defense of the Black Race" held in Sao Paulo in May 1981. At the meeting about 150 representatives from 16 different groups determined to prepare a national report on the problem of unemployment among nonwhites. (c)

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Figure 3

Population of Brazil by Age, 1980

Total Population: 119,024,600

| 60+ |
| 59-45 |
| 44-30 |
| 29-15 |
| 14 and under |

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  10  8  6  4  2  0  2  4  6  8  10
                  Millions
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
Unclassified

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Jobseekers are likely to find opportunities limited largely to unskilled, low-paying work because of lack of training and racial discrimination. Although many coloreds are skilled workers, the majority are employed in casual construction work or temporary service jobs. This informal labor pool is not unionized and employees have little or no job security; employers are not required to compensate for inflation by pegging salary increases to the cost-of-living index, as is done in other sectors of the economy.

Although the majority of coloreds want schooling and see it as a way of improving their lives, few actually acquire an adequate education. Probably less than a third of the coloreds finish secondary school, and a 1968 study showed that less than 3 percent of Brazilian university students were black. An earlier study indicates the percentage of mulattoes in universities is also very low. Government literacy and technical training programs have had some success, but lack of funds prevents them from reaching all who want help;

in 1976 illiteracy in the slums *(favelas)* was estimated at over 30 percent, almost twice the national average. Better schooling alone will not eliminate inequalities, however: analysis of 1960, 1973, and 1976 data demonstrates that blacks and mulattoes typically do not earn as much as whites even when they have comparable or superior educations.

The Brazilian Government's new wage policy, implemented in 1980, is aimed at lessening discontent over income distribution, but the program's long-term impact on coloreds and their grievances is uncertain. Under the new policy, periodic wage increases are granted to all workers, with the poorest receiving the highest percentage increase and the wealthiest the lowest. The prospects for this policy are not necessarily encouraging; several surveys indicate that past real wage gains during the "miracle" years did not markedly improve their status relative to whites, and obviously did little to diminish their bitterness toward discrimination.

Most coloreds have experienced little mobility from generation to generation. In a survey of a medium-sized industrial town in Minas Gerais, one researcher found that only 5 percent of the blacks and mulattoes thought they were better off than their parents, while almost 80 percent of the whites thought so. Similar results have been obtained in studies of intergenerational mobility and in occupational surveys of a number of states in the south and southeast. Even those nonwhites who have moved into the middle class have frequently stated that their mobility has been selective; that is, increases in income and living standards have not been matched with improved access to housing, schools, and social clubs. Indeed, general improvements in the economic conditions of the coloreds would probably intensify racial friction as whites find themselves competing with coloreds for jobs and other benefits of middle class life, and as blacks and mulattoes more fully realize that prejudice is not as class-oriented as they may have once thought.

Increasing Violence. The current economic slowdown in Brazil is one of several causes of the huge increases in crime evident in major urban areas. While both

Figure 4
Educational Levels Attained by the Population of 18 Years and Over According to Race[a]

White ☐ Non white ■ (1972–73 sample)

Percent

[a] The data refer to the South and Southeastern states of Minas Gerais, Espirito Santo, Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul.
[b] Includes both persons who finished and those who entered but did not finish these educational levels.

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Figure 5
Monthly Income in Cruzeiros by Educational Level and Race in Selected States of South and Southeast Brazil (1973)[a]

White ☐ Nonwhite ■

Cruzeros

Adapted from Carlos Alfredo Hasenbalg. "Race Relations in Post-Abolition Brazil" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1978, page 224).
[a] Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul.

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whites and coloreds alike are involved in criminal activity, the press contributes to the perception that most robberies and assaults are committed by blacks and dark mulattoes. Detailed newspaper articles often include the criminals' photographs as well as their personal histories. The identification of coloreds with crime is further reinforced in the press with reports that the incidence of black against white crime frequently involves unwarranted brutality. (c)

Whites are beginning to respond with violence. In a particularly bloody example, a riot broke out in January 1981 in a small town in Sao Paulo State when police moved three blacks accused of raping the daughter of a prominent local family to another jail

after threats were made to lynch them. About 5,000 townspeople fought with police and burned down the local police headquarters; one person was killed and about 40 were injured. The unusually strong popular reaction in this case is believed by US observers to have been at least partly due to racial antipathies and may be another indication of a shift in mood in Brazil on racial matters. In May 1981, a white security guard in Rio de Janeiro shot and killed a black teenager fleeing a drugstore with two tubes of shampoo. The following month, also in Rio de Janeiro, worshipers at the funeral of a highly regarded priest—who died from injuries sustained in an assault in his own church—almost lynched a black youth caught trying to steal a purse; soldiers rescued the boy and turned him over to the police. (c)

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Concern over the racial situation is also generated by accusations against groups such as the *Mao Branca* (White Hand), a notorious vigilante organization that has been active in the larger cities. According to an unsubstantiated statement appearing in an article on "Angry Blacks" in the Paris news magazine *Jeune Afrique*, the *Mao Branca*, as of April 1980, had executed some 250 blacks. Since that time many more executions have reportedly taken place. Recently the director of the MNU claimed that 70 percent of the victims of the death squads are black. (c)

White overreaction to perceived colored crime may be increasing black consciousness and tending to polarize the racial situation. In April 1980, a black was killed by Sao Paulo police in a case of mistaken identity; the victim's sister, who spearheaded strong criticism of the police, has, according to press reports, received notes of solidarity from advocates of black causes and became a symbol of protest. In May 1981, a black employee of a white social club in Rio de Janeiro charged that police, after falsely accusing him of theft, had beaten and tortured him with electric shocks to force a confession. Police harassment and brutality against blacks and dark mulattoes were major reasons for the May 1981 "First State Meeting in Defense of the Black Race" in Sao Paulo, at which it was decided to prepare a national report on police violence against blacks in Brazil. (c)

Demographic Time Bomb. The so-called bleaching process that had encouraged many Brazilian whites to believe that the "Negro problem" would eventually disappear has probably ended. Although 1950 and 1960 census figures show that the brown or mixed element of the population increased as a percentage of the total while the whites remained almost the same and the blacks declined, the still unavailable data from the 1980 census will probably reveal a change in the pattern. (c)

During recent years new factors have apparently come into play to halt the black decline. Brazil's population growth rate has fallen from a high of about 3 percent in 1960 to 2.4 percent today, with much of the decrease attributable to birth control measures. Since it is the predominantly white upper and middle classes that are most likely to practice family planning

and the poor lower class blacks who are least likely to do so, it seems reasonable to suppose that birth rates have been highest in the latter group. European immigration to Brazil, once a principal factor in the bleaching process, has dwindled to relative insignificance. Moreover, if health conditions and medical care continue to improve in Brazil, the mortality rates of the poorest (and darkest) segments of the population will drop more rapidly than those of affluent groups, who already enjoy comparatively high health standards. (c)

Interregional and rural-to-urban migration are bringing more blacks and mulattoes into contact, competition, and possible conflict with whites. The Northeast continues to contribute a steady stream of poor migrants, including many blacks and mulattoes, to the shantytowns ringing Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and other large metropolitan areas of the southeast. Although the scale of northeast-to-southeast migration is somewhat smaller than in the 1960s, analysis of the fragmentary 1980 census data released to date shows that it continues to be substantial. The migrants, most of whom are very poor, with different customs and speech from the southeastern urbanites, are widely believed to be responsible for such social ills as increasing disease, rising crime, and falling real wages. While antipathy is felt toward all migrants, the presence among them of large numbers of coloreds reinforces the identification of this group with the declining quality of life in the cities. (c)

Regional Variations in Race Relations
Although race is likely to play an increasing role in politics and other aspects of national life throughout Brazil, great regional variations will probably still exist. In the Northeast, where almost half of Brazil's colored population live, the persistence of colonial patterns of landholding and exploitation of patron-client relationships have kept racial tensions relatively low. Studies of urban and rural settings indicate that, in this socially stable region, the racial myths are generally accepted by both the colored and the white population. The large number of mulattoes in the region guarantees at least some social mobility, and

the evidence of darker skins and negroid features among many of the "white" elite reduces the likelihood of prejudice based solely on physical characteristics. Despite changes in the regional economy owing to industrialization and the introduction of large-scale commercial agricultural units, traditional social patterns persist and racial tensions are minimal. As the political opening continues, however, the importance of blacks and dark mulattoes as a potential voting bloc will probably increase. (c)

The Southeast with more complex economies and larger white populations is far more likely to be the scene of racial unrest. In cities such as Rio de Janeiro and especially Sao Paulo, economic and social relationships tend to be impersonal, and institutions such as those that help preserve racial tranquility in the northeast either never existed or have been swept aside, leaving a more competitive and threatening environment. As a result, poor coloreds are more vulnerable to negative stereotyping in the Southeast than elsewhere in Brazil and more likely, therefore, to be subjected to racial discrimination. Significantly, most civil rights activities have originated in the industrial centers and have had little support from coloreds in the northeast or other predominantly colored areas. (c)

Outlook and Checklist of Race Relations Indicators
If the trends we have identified continue, race relations will grow in political importance, and racial discontent may reach serious proportions by the end of the decade. Racial incidents, cases of police brutality, economic boycotts, and sporadic large-scale demonstrations could easily occur. How the discontent would be expressed would in part depend on the type of government in power; a repressive regime would likely inhibit overt manifestations of racial unrest. Assuming a repressive regime does not come to power, racially based protests would likely lead the government to take steps to improve the status of coloreds. Characteristically, Brazilians tend to avoid confrontations, and Brazilian governments and institutions have traditionally coped well with social unrest. The elite, using little or no official violence, has preferred to

manipulate or co-opt discordant elements rather than crush them. This has been especially true since the mid-1970s when political liberalization began and government leaders became more sensitive about their democratic image. (c)

The large size of the colored population, pressures to maintain the liberalization process, and concern for Brazil's international image all suggest that officials will become increasingly responsive to minority grievances. The president of the Brazilian Senate has spoken out against racism. Recently on the occasion of the annual UN-initiated "international day for the elimination of racial discrimination," he admitted before an international audience including Africans that masked forms of racism still exist in Brazil. (c)

Nevertheless, change will not come quickly. The Brazilian elite usually addresses grievances only when protests intensify to the point of being a perceived threat to its control, and the "civil rights" movement may have to reach sizable proportions before changes are made. In other words, expectations of advances toward equality may rise faster than the system could or would respond to them. The government would probably use carrot-and-stick tactics, coming down hard on demonstrations that seem to be getting out of hand; but it and other affected segments of the elite would likely make concessions where possible and in general encourage gradual improvements in the social and economic status of coloreds. (c)

The following checklist is intended to assist analysts in monitoring changing patterns in race relations in Brazil. It emphasizes those events and trends that would point to a graver, more politically dangerous future than that which we have presented in this paper. The significance of the indicators is likely to be cumulative; none of them should be considered in isolation. Further, the sequence as well as the type of event is important. What may cause unrest in the short term may lead to greater stability in the long term. (c)

Racial consciousness of coloreds increases significantly presaging the development of an aggressive colored "civil rights" movement:

- Are colored intellectuals not only shifting from folkloric studies to more relevant social issues but also advocating rapid and radical changes in race relations? Are they pressing for large-scale affirmative action programs in their publications? Are they calling for fundamental structural changes in Brazil's economy or society?
- Do newspaper accounts indicate that racial demonstrations are sharply increasing in number, size, intensity, and level of organization? Do the demonstrators focus their protests against the larger issue of racism rather than against specific incidents? Are demonstrations becoming violent, involving the destruction of property? Are police being attacked? (c)

Race becomes an increasingly important political factor:

- Do demonstrations and statements by black and mulatto leaders show that coloreds are viewing their own problems as transcending those of class and other nonracial group interests? Do economic demands by poor coloreds indicate they are differentiating themselves from poor whites? Are colored workers protesting that white-dominated unions are not looking out for their interests?
- Do reports show that *favela* political and social organizations are forming along color lines rather than remaining class oriented?
- Are any of the Afro-Brazilian cult centers, samba clubs, or other now largely apolitical colored associations turning into centers for political agitation and propaganda?
- Is the colored leadership calling for the creation of a colored voting bloc?
- Is a colored political party being formed?
- Are allies being sought for the colored cause in one of the established parties?
- Have radical planks related to colored rights and antiracism appeared in a political party's platform?
- Are domestic dissident groups attempting to exploit the racial issue?

- Is the Catholic Church pressing for greater political participation specifically for the colored poor rather than for the poor in general? Are individual members of the clergy voicing the political grievances of coloreds? (s)

Government actions and responses (or lack of them) to colored pressures for change exacerbate racial tensions:
- Has one of the few blacks occupying a high-level government post been replaced by a white? Are coloreds protesting that the change involved racial discrimination?
- Has a flagrant violation of the open-housing law or any other antidiscrimination law been protested and the offender still gone unpunished?
- Has there been a sharp decrease (or increase) in coloreds enrolled in the Superior War College, the Army Command and General Staff School, or other officer training centers? Do the curriculums of these schools indicate a new concern for racial unrest?
- Is government attention to the needs of the predominantly colored Northeast being reduced in an obvious way? Are government funds for projects benefiting the colored population of the region being drastically cut? (c)

International pressures and considerations worsen Brazil's race problem:
- Is Nigeria openly using oil to force changes in Brazilian racial policies? Have Brazilian whites responded by decreasing rather than increasing opportunities for coloreds?
- Is Brazil slacking off in its attacks on South Africa in international forums?
- Is Brazil's foreign service losing any of its few black officials?
- Has a black African country withdrawn diplomatic representatives from Brazil?
- Are international human rights organizations pressing Brazil to improve race relations? Are they reporting on deteriorating conditions?
- Do leading US, African, and European newspapers regularly report on the racial situation in Brazil?

- Are delegations of Brazilian coloreds traveling to other countries to seek support?
- Is Cuba or any other Communist nation attempting to exacerbate the racial situation in Brazil through overt or covert means? (C)

White apprehensions about the race problem intensify because new 1980 census data discredit the "whitening" thesis:
- Does the census show that coloreds, especially blacks, are increasing more than expected as a percentage of the total population?
- Do media articles highlight the demographic shift and make it a focus of attention and controversy?
- Is the shift being blamed on the coloreds' failure to adopt birth control?
- Are laws being proposed to stem the tide of colored migration to urban areas? (C)

Racial polarization intensifies as analysis of 1980 census data destroys the illusion of social and economic mobility for coloreds:
- Do analytical reports of unemployment and income statistics point up the disparities between whites and coloreds of all socioeconomic classes?
- Are civil rights advocates and politicians in their speeches and publications exploiting the findings of the census in a way that will increase discontent among coloreds? (C)

Increasingly violent forms of racism spread:
- Are pictures of blacks and dark mulattoes criminal offenders appearing more often in newspapers? If not, do the newspaper articles identify criminals by race? Do letters to the editor express growing white concern for colored criminality?
- Does media coverage of crime include a large number of reports of police brutality against blacks and mulattoes? Are coloreds protesting against police brutality?
- Are legitimate demonstrations against racism being violently suppressed by security forces?
- Are white vigilante groups becoming more active? Are lynchings of blacks and mulattoes on the increase?
- Are cases of arson and looting being blamed in the press on the racial situation? (C)

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Appendix A

Potential for Leftist Exploitation
of the Race Issue

Brazilian security officials claim that colored protest groups have been infiltrated by Communists, noting, for example, that the first president of the United Negro Movement is an avowed Marxist. We have no evidence, however, that leftists are openly exploiting the race issue or that blacks and mulattoes have been attracted to terrorist organizations. Most extremist groups, which are largely drawn from the white middle class, adhere to the doctrinaire Marxist line of "support for the unity of the masses." The infiltration of many leftists into unions and other organizations places them in excellent positions to exploit racial unrest should they decide to do so. They might well view race riots and related turmoil as opportunities to discredit the liberalization process and gain influence with a significant segment of the population.

A number of Marxist-oriented groups, dormant since the late 1960s, have recently been reactivated and could exploit the race issue. They are recruiting among returning political exiles and becoming active in labor unions, civic associations, and legal political parties, such as the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party and the Workers Party. The following list includes some of the more important Marxist-leftist groups and the types of legal organizations they have penetrated:

PCB

The Moscow-line Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), at least 30,000 members strong, is seeking legal status but at the same time is penetrating professional and working-class labor unions throughout Brazil and fighting government efforts to create a labor movement free from Communist influence.

PC do B

Also active in penetrating working-class and political organizations is the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B), the much smaller Maoist-line Communist faction. In 1979, it supported the extreme leftist victors of the National Student Union (UNE) elections.

MEP

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Proletariat (MEP) is a small terrorist group that is active in a number of labor and student organizations in Rio de Janeiro.

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MR-8	The Revolutionary Movement-8 (MR-8) is a leftist terrorist guerrilla group centered in Rio de Janeiro. Brazilian security service reports indicate that members of the movement have infiltrated *favela* residents' associations in the roles of lawyers and medical personnel. MR-8 has formed an alliance with Luis Carlos Prestes, former head of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB).
MPL	The principal goal of the non-Communist leftist Popular Liberation Movement (MPL) is to create a nationwide central labor union. In 1979 the movement gained control over the Sao Paulo bank tellers union and was active in promoting a strike.
MCS	The Socialist Convergence Movement (MCS) has evolved into an umbrella organization that includes student and intellectual components; it is linked to terrorist groups in Argentina and Portugal. The MCS has been accused of provoking labor unrest and of turning out leftist propaganda through its own publishing company. It is especially active in Sao Paulo.
OS	The Union Opposition (OS) is a nonterrorist leftist group with a strong following among liberal Brazilians, including church leaders. It is active in Sao Paulo and supported the 1978 metal workers strike.
VPR	The People's Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR), a leftist terrorist organization, participated in several kidnapings during the 1960s. Police destroyed the VPR between 1968 and 1972, but in 1978 Brazilian security officials reported meetings of several members aimed at reviving the group. In mid-1981 investigators blamed the VPR for the controversial bombings at Rio de Janeiro's convention center, which many observers believed were perpetrated by military hardliners.
VAR-Palmares	The Armed Vanguard of Palmares (VAR-Palmares) is a Maoist group named after the famous Palmares slave hideaway of colonial times; but, despite its name, the group is not known to have actively exploited the racial issue. The organization has supporters in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Parana, and Minas Gerais.

The above appendix is Secret.

Appendix B

Bibliography and Note on Research

This paper is based mostly on the analysis of unclassified secondary sources: books, journals, and newspapers. Classified material obtained from the Clandestine Service and through the Office of Central Reference's RECON data retrieval system was also used. Subject areas researched include Brazilian history, political science, sociology, economics, demography, and literature. With aid from the Foreign Documents Division, FBIS, a large number of Brazilian newspapers, especially *O Globo* of Rio de Janeiro and *O Estado de Sao Paulo,* were perused on race relations; this provided much of our information on recent protests and demonstrations. The US Embassy's reporting on crime and violence, black cultural events, and African responses to racism in Brazil has been especially helpful. Valuable insights were also gained from descriptions of the racial situation provided by the US Consulate in Porto Alegre.

The lack of current statistical data posed a special problem and made assessing the status, and even the numbers of blacks and mulattoes, difficult. While Brazilian Government and private-sector researchers have collected and analyzed large amounts of information on income levels and distribution, occupation, education, living conditions, health, migration, and public opinion, very little of this material has been correlated by race since at least 1960. Therefore, most studies specifically dealing with race are based on extrapolated data and estimates using pre-1960 information or on small-scale surveys. The recently completed—but not yet published—1980 census, which once again includes color categories, will provide analysts, as well as Brazilian civil rights activists, with the information necessary to update studies on blacks and mulattoes. We do not expect the findings to alter the basic assessment of this paper.

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